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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, ] 
Plaintiff and Respondent 
vs. ] 
THOMAS R. HUMPHRIES, ] 
Defendant and Appellant. 
i Priority No. 2 
1 Case No. 900006 
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS AND JURISDICTION 
Mr. Humphries filed a pro se petition for writ of 
certiorari on January 16, 1990, seeking review of a Court of 
Appeals decision, Case No. 880704-CA, affirming his criminal 
conviction in a jury trial. The Court granted Mr. Humphries' 
petition on April 24, 1990. The Court has jurisdiction to decide 
this appeal pursuant to Section 78-2-3(a) of the Utah Judicial 
Code (Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-3(a) (Supp. 1990)). 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
There are two primary issues on appeal: 
1. In his appeal to the Utah Court of Appeals, was 
Mr. Humphries denied the effective assistance of counsel, as 
guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution of the 
United States? 
2. Was Mr. Humphries entitled to have new counsel 
appointed by the Utah Court of Appeals? 
022390.mb.ejx.apbriefJmm 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES 
The following U.S. constitutional provisions are 
determinative: 
U.S. CONSTITUTION - AMENDMENT VI 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall 
enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an 
impartial jury of the State and district wherein the 
crime shall have been committed, which district shall 
have been previously ascertained by law, and to be 
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to 
have the compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in 
his favor, and to have the assistance of counsel for 
his defense. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Mr. Humphries appeals the decisions of the Utah Court 
of Appeals, affirming his criminal conviction and denying his 
motion to appoint new counsel on appeal. The Court granted Mr. 
Humphries1 pro se Petition for Writ of Certiorari. 
Course of Proceedings 
Mr. Humphries was convicted in a jury trial on November 
4, 1988, of issuing a bad check, in Second Judicial District 
Court, Davis County, the Honorable Douglas L. Cornaby, presiding. 
Mr. Humphries appealed his conviction to the Utah Court of 
Appeals. In a memorandum decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed 
Mr. Humphries1 conviction. Mr. Humphries filed a Petition for 
Writ of Certiorari with the Court, which was granted April 24, 
1990. 
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Facts Relevant to the Present Appeal 
Facts Relative to Conduct of Counsel at Trial 
1. Mr. Humphries was tried before a jury for issuing 
a bad check. (Trial Transcript, p. 22). Mr. Humphries1 sole 
defense was that he had given $3,600 to a friend of his, Dorie 
Stewart, and assumed the money had been deposited by her in his 
bank account. (Id. at 174-178). 
2. Dorie Stewart was called by the defense and was 
asked some preliminary questions. Defense counsel then asked: 
"At one time did Tom give you some money towards the middle part 
of May?" Before she could answer, the prosecutor requested to 
voir dire the witness. The jury was removed and the prosecutor 
conducted the following examination: 
BY MR. NAMBA: 
Q. Dorie, do you understand what the Fifth Amendment 
of the Constitution — when we talk about taking the Fifth 
Amendment, do you know what that means? 
A. Uh-huh. 
Q. Do you understand that you have a right against 
having to say anything in court that would indicate that 
you've done anything that's criminal? Do you understand 
that? 
A. Yes. 
Q. I'm having to anticipate somewhat some of the 
things that you might be asked to testify about just based 
upon the conversations that I've had from counsel. 
Do you understand that if you took money without 
permission from someone, even though that person may have 
owed you that money, that could be considered theft? 
A. Yeah. 
Q. That you could be prosecuted for that? 
A. Uh-huh. 
Q. You understand, as you testify here, no one has 
offered you any immunity and you could, therefore 
— the things that you say here could be used against you? 
A. Uh-huh. 
Q. You understand, also what the word "perjury" means? 
A. Yeah. 
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Q. Could you explain to the Court what you understand 
perjury to mean. 
A. If I get up here and I don't tell the truth, lying 
to the Court. 
Q. You understand there would be a criminal penalty if 
you were to say anything other than the truth? 
A. Uh-huh. 
Q. Understanding those things, you understand that if 
you desire not to testify, you can tell counsel or the Court 
that you don't want to answers questions? 
A. Uh-huh. 
Q. Even though, and that you still want to answer 
questions today? 
A. Yeah. 
. . . . 
THE WITNESS: Can I ask a question? 
THE COURT: Just a minute, wait outside again. 
THE WITNESS: If you start asking me questions about 
the money and I don't want to answer, I don't have to answer 
if I take the Fifth Amendment? 
THE COURT: Let me explain what it is. Any answer that 
would tend to incriminate you in a crime, you are not 
required to answer and you can say: "I wish not to answer 
that based on the Fifth Amendment because it would tend to 
incriminate me." That's what you must say. 
Mr. Humphries' counsel did not object to the voir dire. The jury 
was brought back in, defense counsel rephrased his initial 
question and Ms. Stewart refused to answer, citing the Fifth 
Amendment. Defense counsel tried a slightly different question. 
Ms. Stewart gave the same response. She was excused. 
3. In closing argument, the prosecutor referred to 
Ms. Stewart's failure to testify as follows: 
We had a witness who took the stand who said nothing. 
Dorie said nothing. She took the Fifth Amendment. 
What does that mean to you? Don't get caught in the 
trap to think that's an admission on her part. I 
submit to you that she didn't want to hurt her friends 
here, that her friend had asked her to come and 
testify, gave her a subpoena which she couldn't 
disobey. She had to sit on the stand. She wanted to 
tell the truth. She didn't want to lie, but she also 
didn't want to tell the hard truth and that is that 
this man is dishonest. She took the easy way out by 
claiming the Fifth Amendment. 
02239O.mb.ejs.apbriefJvum 4 
(Id. at 216-217). Mr. Humphries1 counsel did not object. 
4. The judge gave no instruction on how or if the 
jury was to interpret Ms. Stewart's reliance on the Fifth 
Amendment in her refusal to answer questions. Mr. Humphries1 
counsel did not request such an instruction nor did he object to 
its absence. 
5. The prosecutor, in cross-examining Mr. Humphries, 
asked the following: "Q. Steve is a friend of yours? A. A 
business relationship. Q. You didn't ask him to come and 
testify?" (id. at 182). Counsel for the defense did not object 
to the question. In closing argument, the prosecutor then 
remarked on Mr. Humphries' failure to establish his defense: 
Don't you think you could come up with some proof that 
you held an insurance claim with someone when you have 
three partners to split the money, two other partners 
to split the money with, one of them that would come 
and testify that we split the money with him or the 
insurance company? 
(Id. at 215) . Mr. Humphries1 counsel did not object to the 
prosecutor's statement. 
6. During closing argument, the prosecutor, at least 
five times, called Mr. Humphries dishonest, in just those terms.1 
He both began and ended his closing argument with that point. 
His first sentence included the following: " . . . [W]e never 
1
"The Defendant is a dishonest person," (.id. at 212); "this 
man is dishonest," (id. at 217); "disregard the testimony of the 
Defendant because of his dishonesty," (Id. at 227); "I've tried 
to tell to today that the defendant is dishonest," (id. at 228); 
and, "That's the statement of a dishonest man." (Id. at 230). 
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told you that the Defendant was going to be honest, that he was 
going to tell the truth, or that he had ever told the truth in 
any day of his life" (id. at 211) and his last sentence began: 
"That's the statement of a dishonest man . . . ." (Id. at 230). 
Mr. Humphries' trial attorney made no objections at any time 
during closing argument. 
Facts Relative to Conduct of Counsel on Appeal 
7. At sentencing, Mr. Cathcart, Mr. Humphries' trial 
counsel, informed the court he had taken on Mr. Humphries' 
representation because all three public defenders had conflicts, 
including Mr. Vanderlinden. (Sentencing Transcript, December 6, 
1988, p. 10; "THE COURT: Okay. Why were you appointed as 
opposed to Mr. Vanderlinden or Mr. Oda? MR. CATHCART: All three 
public defenders had a conflict is what I was told by Mr. 
Cella.") 
8. Mr. Cathcart withdrew from representing Mr. 
Humphries after sentencing. (Id. at 9.) 
9. At the first hearing on the motion for certificate 
of probable cause, December 20, 1988, the other attorneys in the 
public defender office indicated to the court, and it also began 
to dawn on Mr. Humphries, that Mr. Vanderlinden had made and was 
making every effort to avoid representing Mr. Humphries, both at 
trial and on appeal.2 (Motion for Certificate of Probable Cause 
2MR. CELLA: . . . Under the public defender system 
contract, my conflicts of interest are supposed to be assigned to 
Mr. Vanderlinden. Mr. Vanderlinden felt that the conflict 
generated by my prosecution for Kaysville City was not a true 
conflict under the scope of the public defender contract, and he 
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transcriptf December 20, 1988, pp. 3-6). Mr. Humphries 
acquiesced to Mr. Vanderlinden representing him on appeal at that 
time. (id. at 5-6) 
10. At a hearing on January 3, 1989, the suggestion 
that Mr. Vanderlinden had a conflict preventing him from 
representing Mr. Humphries was resolved. Mr. Humphries also 
expressed that he had no personal conflict with Mr. Vanderlinden, 
declined to accept the —accept the case through the public 
defender system. 
MR. CELLA: Stephan [Oda] and I spent a few minutes talking 
with Judge Page about the probability of trying to get some idea 
of where the Court wanted us to go on this matter. And Judge 
Page requested and said that in situations such as that and in 
the event that Mr. Vanderlinden declined to accept my conflict of 
interest, that that position should be made known to the Court. 
THE COURT: When did you talk to Mr. Vanderlinden last on 
this? I talked to him a week ago, and he was going to do this 
personally. 
MR. CELLA: That's total news to me. 
THE COURT: I talked with him right after we were in court 
two weeks ago. I worked with him for three or four days. And by 
Friday, a week ago, last Friday, he said I'll take the case. 
MR. CELLA: . . . So in any event, as I was explaining, 
Judge Page said in additional situations such as that, I should 
merely inform the Court and order the Court to order Mr. 
Vanderlinden to take the case. And Judge Page said that would be 
how to handle the matter. 
THE COURT: . . . Mr. Vanderlinden has already accepted the 
case and was supposed to be here today. I was surprised he 
wasn't here. 
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since he "never met the gentleman before." However, Mr. 
Humphries expressed concern that "Attorney Vanderlinden, he 
doesn't want to argue the specific [sic - probably "certificate"] 
of probable cause, a few issues actually," and, later on in the 
hearing, qualified the judge's assertion that he had not objected 
to the appointment of Mr. Vanderlinden with "[o]nly if he can 
effectively represent me . . . ." (Transcript. January 3, 1989, 
pp. 5-6) 
11. Mr. Humphries requested appointment of counsel 
other that Mr. Vanderlinden by way of a handwritten letter to the 
judge and a motion dated January 10, 1989. (District Court file, 
pp. 108-111). At a hearing prompted by the letter and motion, 
Mr. Humphries expressed frustration over Mr« Vanderlindenfs 
apparent lack of preparation to date and lack of communication 
with him. The court gave him the choice of proceeding pro se or 
using Mr. Vanderlinden. (Hearing Transcript. January 31, 1989). 
12. At the March 14, 1989 hearing on his motion for 
certificate of probable cause, Mr. Humphries again expressed 
frustration at Mr. Vanderlinden1s lack of communication with him 
and forewarned the court that Mr. Humphries might need to present 
issues that Mr. Vanderlinden might not argue. (Motion for 
Certificate of Probable Cause Transcript. March 14, 1989, pp. 3-
6) 
13. The crux of Mr. Humphries1 disagreements with Mr. 
Vanderlinden1s handling of his case came out in the March 28, 
1989 hearing of the motion for certificate of probable cause. 
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Mr. Vanderlinden raised various issues in support of the motion, 
to which the prosecutor responded. Mr. Humphries then addressed 
the court: 
Your Honor, if I may, please. I asked counsel to bring 
up these issues before. He didn't think it was proper at 
the time, but I think he has second thoughts after Attorney 
Namba. 
Attorney Namba brought up the issue of prosecutorial 
misconduct. And we would ask the Court that it would 
consider the misconduct, the statements of dishonesty 
throughout his closing argument when viewed as a whole 
whether they would be considered plain error and to go 
further into the ineffectiveness of counsel during the 
trial, for counsel not to object to all these different 
things through the trial: the voir dire, Attorney Namba's 
repeated references to my dishonesty, instructions to the 
jury, even association whether the jury foreman recognized a 
witness. And Attorney Cathcart failed to object, and the 
Court did not delve in a little bit further into that 
relationship. So when viewed as a whole, would Attorney 
Cathcart's representation be considered ineffective 
assistance of counsel? 
(Certificate of Probable Cause Transcript, March 28, 1989, pp. 
19-20). Mr. Humphries also reiterated his attorney's failure to 
communicate. "Your Honor, if I may, I've had no conversation 
with Attorney Vanderlinden whatsoever. If I could direct the 
Court to also notify me from the Court directly and not just 
through Vanderlinden." (Jd. at 20) 
14. In his ruling on the motion for certificate of 
probable cause, as to two issues raised by Mr. Vanderlinden in 
his argument, the judge described the State's actions as 
improper, but in both instances indicated that no objections had 
been made at trial by defendant's counsel. As to a third issue, 
the court, while noting no substantive error, further noted that 
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no proper objection was made in any case. The court did not 
respond to the "plain error" and "ineffective assistance of 
counsel" claims raised by Mr. Humphries in oral argument. 
(District Court file, pp. 204-205) 
15. In his appeal brief to the Utah Court of Appeals, 
Mr. Vanderlinden did not raise the "plain error" or "ineffective 
assistance of counsel" claims. The State, not surprisingly and 
taking its que from the judge's decision in the motion for 
certificate of probable cause, argued to the Court of Appeals 
that four of the five issues raised on appeal had not been 
preserved for appeal. 
16. Mr. Humphries again attempted to seek appointment 
of new counsel pro se, this time in motion made to the Court of 
Appeals. The motion was denied, apparently without hearing, and 
on the justification that all materials due from Mr. Vanderlinden 
had been filed timely with the Court of Appeals and upon the 
finding that "Appellant show no substantial conflict of interest 
with his attorney." (Order, July 20, 1989. A copy of the 
stamped "filed" order is attached as Exhibit 1.) 
17. The Court of Appeals held that four of the five 
issues raised by Mr. Vanderlinden had not been preserved for 
appeal due to trial counsel's failure to object during trial. 
ARGUMENT 
I. Summary of Argument 
Defendant was denied his right to effective appellant 
counsel by counsel's failure to raise meritorious issues before 
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the Court of Appeals, contrary to professional standards of 
performance, and contrary to the express wishes of his client. 
Defendant was also denied the effective assistance of 
counsel by the Court of Appeals denial of his motion to appoint 
new counsel during the pendency of the appeal. 
II. Denial of Effective Assistance of Appellate Counsel 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 
80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), provides the standard by which courts must 
determine whether a criminal defendant has been denied the 
effective assistance of counsel at trial. As this Court has 
noted: 
In order to prevail on such a claim, a defendant must 
show, first, that his or her counsel rendered a 
deficient performance in some demonstrable manner, 
which performance fell below an objective standard of 
reasonable professional judgment, and, second, that 
counsel's performance prejudiced the defendant. 
State v. Carter, 776 P.2d 886, 893 (1989). That is the law with 
respect to effective assistance of trial counsel. 
The law as to denial of effective assistance of 
appellate counsel appears somewhat more unsettled, particularly 
in Utah where the issue has not been directly addressed. In 
other jurisdictions, there is a split of authority on the 
standard to be applied in appellate counsel's performance. As 
set forth in some detail in People v. Valdez, 789 P.2d 406 (Colo. 
1990), the U.S. Supreme Court has not yet articulated a test for 
determining ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claims. 
As a result, some jurisdictions have simply adopted the 
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Strickland two-part test, deficient performance by appellate 
counsel and prejudice to the defendant must both be shown in 
order for a defendant to prevail on the claim. In Valdez, the 
Colorado court adopted the Strickland test for ineffective 
appellate counsel claims. 
Importantly, as noted in Valdez, "[o]ther courts have 
indicated that, for purposes of determining whether a particular 
defendant has been denied effective assistance of appellate 
counsel, deficient performance alone is sufficient to establish a 
deprivation of the constitutional right.11 Id. at 410 (citations 
omitted) . 
Defendant urges adoption of the single standard by the 
Court. Establishing a deficient performance by an appellate 
counsel is a heavy burden that, if met, would already strongly 
suggest that an appellant's position on appeal had been 
prejudiced. Proof that defendant would have obtained a more 
favorable result on appeal requires examination into both the 
appeal process itself and the underlying trial issues on appeal. 
In any event, defendant's recitation of and analysis of 
the facts in this case and the controlling law establishes that, 
in this case, both Strickland elements have been met and 
defendant was, indeed, denied effective assistance of appellate 
3Interestingly, none of the cases cited by the Court in 
footnote 2 6 of Carter dealt with the deficient performance issue, 
since the Court disposed of the claims on the prejudice issue 
alone, finding no prejudice to the defendant in every case. 
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counsel in violation of his Sixth Amendment constitutional 
rights. 
Ill, Defendant Was Denied Effective Assistance of Appeal Counsel 
A. Counsel's Performance Was Deficient. 
Mr. Vanderlinden failed to raise or argue on appeal 
that Mr. Humphries was denied the effective assistance of trial 
counsel when trial counsel did not object to various clearly 
objectionable tactics of the prosecutor. Mr. Vanderlinden also 
failed to raise or argue on appeal that the errors complained of 
were manifest or plain errors, for which objections at trial were 
not necessary in order to preserve the issues for appeal. 
In another context, such failure may not amount to a 
deficient professional performance. Given the peculiar facts of 
this case, however, it is apparent that Mr. Vanderlinden1s 
performance was deficient. 
Mr. Vanderlinden represented Mr. Humphries in the post-
trial motions phase of this case, in addition to representing him 
on appeal. In the certificate of probable cause hearing and in 
its order, the trial judge alerted Mr. Vanderlinden to the 
problem of trial counsel's failure to object during trial to the 
various tactics that became the issues on appeal. The judge's 
order indicated that three of the issues, whether meritorious or 
not, were not reserved by proper objection during trial. The 
judge indicated that some actions by the State were, in fact, 
improper, but that defendant did not object (an observation 
echoed by the Court of Appeals). Mr. Vanderlinden1s independent 
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review of the transcript surely further highlighted the failure 
of trial counsel to object at appropriate times.4 
Mr. Humphries, at the hearing on March 28, 1989, made 
it clear that he was aware of and had discussed the ineffective 
assistance of counsel and plain error issues with Mr. 
Vanderlinden prior to that hearing and that Mr. Vanderlinden had 
indicated "[h]e didn't think it was proper at the time." Which 
left Mr. Humphries to argue the issues orally to the judge. The 
issues were, thus, well known to Mr. Vanderlinden as his client 
had expressed his interest in pursuing them. 
While it is easy in hindsight to second guess an 
attorney's appellate performance5, two meritorious defenses to 
defendant's conviction were not argued to the Utah Court of 
Appeals. Not only were the claims meritorious, they turned out 
to be the only claims that defendant could have used to overcome 
what later become the Court of Appeals' decision that four of 
defendant's five claims of error had not been preserved for 
appeal by trial counsel. 
The doctrine of plain error does not require that the 
error be raised or the issue reserved at trial to be asserted on 
appeal. Instead, if the error is obvious and is harmful 
(prejudicial to the defendant), an appellate court can review and 
4The State picked up on this information. Its brief on 
appeal relied almost exclusively on the theory that none of the 
issues had been preserved for appeal. 
5I am looking over my shoulder as I prepare this brief. 
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rule on the error• See, e.g.. State v. Anderson. 789 P.2d 27, 29 
(Utah 1990) and cases cited in footnote 6 thereof; State v. 
Bullock. 791 P.2d 155 (Utah 1989); Utah Rules of Evidence 103(d). 
Likewise, a claim that trial counsel was ineffective 
can be asserted on appeal for the first time, which is obvious 
since it will rarely be trial counsel himself or herself who will 
raise the issue of his or her own ineffectiveness. 
The converse to the above discussion is also well 
established law. "[I]n the absence of exceptional circumstances 
or plain error, an appellate court normally will not consider 
issues, even constitutional ones, that have not been presented 
first to the trial court for its consideration and resolution." 
State v. Webb. 790 P.2d 65, 71 n.2 (Utah App. 1990) (citing State 
v. Anderson, supra). See also State v. Verde. 770 P.2d 116, 118 
(Utah 1989) ("Ordinarily, the failure to raise an objection below 
would preclude our consideration of this argument on appeal.") 
Mr Vanderlinden knew the objections had not been made during 
trial by Mr. Humphries1 counsel, so that absent unusual 
circumstances the claims were not preserved for appeal. 
Yet, despite his forewarning from a review of the trial 
transcript and from the judge's decision on the certificate of 
probable cause that the issues he was pursuing had not been 
properly objected to or reserved for appeal, despite his own 
client urging him to make the claims, despite his presumed 
knowledge of the law, Mr. Vanderlinden did not make the plain 
error or ineffective assistance claims. 
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This was not simply an error in strategy or tactics on 
appeal. It was a deficient legal performance on appeal by Mr. 
Vanderlinden, and expressly and intentionally contrary to his 
client's requests and admonitions that those issues be presented 
to the Court of Appeals. Everyone else was aware of the 
fundamental problem with Mr. Vanderlindenfs chosen approach, the 
trial judge, the State prosecutor, the Attorney General, and the 
three-member appeals panel. 
B. Defendant Was Prejudiced by Counsel's Ineffectiveness. 
The Court of Appeals would have reversed defendant's 
conviction had the proper issues been raised and argued. The 
substantive law cited in Mr. Vanderlinden's appeal brief and his 
application of the law to the facts is, for the most part, very 
accurate. But for his failure to argue that the errors were not 
objected to in timely fashion, raising the issue of denial of 
effective assistance of counsel, or that they were obvious and 
harmful, raising the issue of plain error, he would have in all 
likelihood prevailed. 
As evidence of his likelihood of prevailing on the 
proper issue on appeal, note that the trial court, in its ruling 
on the motion for certificate of probable cause, indicated "[t]he 
State should not have questioned the defendant about his failure 
to have Steve Brown come to court and testify.11 District Court 
file, p. 2 05. The Court of Appeals also said "it is 
inappropriate during cross examination for the prosecution to 
022390.mb.ejs.apbriefJium 16 
make any suggestion that defendant has a burden to establish a 
defense. . . ." 
Examined on appeal for their substance and without the 
shackles of trial counsel's failure to object, it is obvious that 
the prosecutor committed several significant errors, any one of 
which is sufficient grounds for reversal, but all of which add up 
to a very tainted trial. 
The defendant had one and only one defense, having 
admitted to opening the bank account, making a $100 deposit and 
then writing checks totalling more than $100. His defense was 
that he had received $3,600 and had given it to Dorie Stewart to 
deposit in his account. Apart from his own testimony regarding 
the event, the only corroborating testimony for Mr. Humphries 
could come from Ms. Stewart herself. She became the key witness 
for the defense and she also became the only person on whom the 
prosecutor focused his "voir dire," explaining the far-fetched 
notion that Ms. Stewart might face criminal prosecution for theft 
if she took money from someone without permission whether they 
owed her the money or not. 
The prosecutor's intimidation of the defendant's key 
witness, singling her out for the cautionary statements about 
perjury, suggesting that she could be prosecuted for theft in 
most unusual ways, without intervention of the court and without 
mention of her possible need to consult independent counsel, this 
was calculated to drive the witness from the stand, and resulted 
in her not testifying. The United States Supreme Court found 
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such conduct by a judge to be violative of the defendant's right 
under the Fourteenth Amendment to the voluntary and free 
testimony of witnesses on his behalf, in Webb v. Texas, 409 U.S. 
95, 93 S.Ct. 351, 34 L.Ed.2d 330 (1972). 
Mr. Humphries' situation meets the criteria the Arizona 
Supreme Court noted was most frequently present in granting 
reversal. In State v. Dumaine. 783 P.2d 1184, 1191 (Ariz. 1989), 
the court noted that "cases requiring reversal usually arise 
where the defendant was completely deprived of the defense 
witness's testimony." That is what happened here, after the 
intimidation by the prosecutor of Ms. Stewart. 
Once the prosecutor was successful in shutting Ms. 
Stewart's mouth, he focused his attack on the only other person 
to testify to anything of substance for the defense, Mr. 
Humphries. No fewer than five times in closing argument he 
called Mr. Humphries dishonest, and implied the same throughout 
his closing argument. The trial judge makes the astounding leap 
of reasoning in his ruling on the motion for certificate of 
probable cause that "[w]hat the State was really saying, however, 
was that the evidence shows the defendant was dishonest." 
(District Court file at 205) . Unfortunately, the Court of 
Appeals did not have to dissect that reasoning because of the 
trial counsel's failure to object and appellate counsel's failure 
to raise the appropriate issues for consideration. 
Had they examined the reasoning, the Court of Appeals 
would have agreed that the prosecutor, in closing argument, was 
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referencing matters not in evidence, and, therefore, not to be 
speculated about, and was offering his personal opinion about the 
defendant's veracity in testifying, without a single reference to 
the evidence. Since the defendant had admitted to everything the 
prosecution was trying to prove but the defendant's intent to 
write checks on insufficient funds, the prosecution in closing 
argument can only be referring to Mr. Humphries' own testimony 
regarding his belief that a deposit of $3,600 had been made to 
his bank account or to the unheard testimony of Ms. Stewart. 
Let's take those possibilities one at a time. If 
the prosecution was saying in closing argument "Mr. Humphries is 
lying about his belief as to the deposit having been made" he was 
expressing his personal opinion, pure and simple. There was no 
contrary evidence regarding Mr. Humphries' belief as to the 
deposit having been made. Yet, instead of telling the jury they 
should convict because the circumstantial evidence discredits Mr. 
Humphries' testimony, and leaving it to the jury to weigh the 
conflicting evidence and come to a conclusion, the prosecution 
says "this man is dishonest," over and over and over again. Not 
only was all of Mr. Humphries1 testimony immediately discredited 
by such a blatant personal attack, but the jurors were then left 
to wonder what else the prosecutor knew that gave him such a 
violent opinion of the untrustworthiness of the defendant. 
The second possibility, that of the prosecution 
referring in closing to the unheard testimony of Ms. Stewart, is 
what the prosecution in fact did, in reference to the dishonesty 
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of Mr. Humphries. Not only did the prosecution improperly 
suppose that Ms. Stewart's testimony would have had to have been 
a lie to support Mr. Humphries, but he ended by saying "[s]he 
didn't want to lie, but she also didn't want to tell the hard 
truth and that is that this man is dishonest. She took the easy 
way out by claiming the Fifth Amendment." Trial Transcript at 
217 (emphasis added). 
In one highly improper and prejudicial fell swoop, the 
prosecutor speculated as to the unheard testimony of Ms. Stewart 
and assured the jury that it provided further evidence Mr. 
Humphries was a liar. 
There was no objection to any of the foregoing, an 
obvious and clear error by Mr. Humphries' trial attorney. 
Neither was there any attempt to alleviate the problem through 
requested instructions, explanations or intervention of the trial 
judge or counsel for the defendant. To the jury, defendant was 
left looking like a liar who had tried to get Ms. Stewart to lie 
for him in alibi. Yet, Ms. Stewart having taken the Fifth 
Amendment suggests exactly the opposite (i.e., that she did 
indeed receive money from Mr. Humphries and did not do with it 
what she told him she would and was, therefore, afraid of 
prosecution), which makes the prosecutor's speculation about her 
failure to testify doubly-damaging and deliberately confusing to 
the jury. 
Personal opinions of the prosecutor expressed in 
closing argument are grounds for reversal. This universal rule 
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is well illustrated in State v. Reed, 684 P.2d 699 (Wash. 1984), 
which has some parallels useful to consider in the present case. 
In a jury trial for murder, the prosecutor called the defendant a 
liar three times during closing argument and made other 
references outside the scope of the evidence. The Washington 
Supreme Court overturned the court of appeals decision that, 
although improper, the statements were not prejudicial. The 
supreme court noted that the statements were prejudicial as 
striking at the heart of the defense raised and there was a 
substantial likelihood the comments affected the jury. Id. at 
703. 
Likewise here, the untoward comments of the prosecutor 
went to the heart of the defense in the action and, far from 
being harmless, were calculated to paint Mr. Humphries as totally 
dishonest, making his entire testimony unbelievable, and to 
improperly suggest that Ms. Stewart would have had to have lied 
to corroborate Mr. Humphries' version of events. 
Had the Court of Appeals gotten to the substance of the 
claims of error, it would have reversed the conviction of Mr. 
Humphries due to the prejudicial nature of the errors. Mr. 
Vanderlinden's failure to raise the appropriate issues was the 
cause of Mr. Humphries' failure at the Court of Appeals. 
IV. Court of Appeals Actions Denied Appellant His Right to 
Counsel 
Mr. Humphries made a motion to the Court of Appeals to 
grant him new counsel on appeal. The motion was denied. The 
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failure of the Court of Appeals to follow its own admonitions in 
ascertaining the reasons for Mr. Humphries1 motion, in carefully 
considering the motion and in making an informed decision 
resulted in Mr. Humphries being denied effective assistance of 
appellate counsel. 
The motion was made pro se and was answered by the 
Court of Appeals order denying the motion, citing as its reasons 
the promptness of Mr. Vanderlinden in filing required documents 
with the court and the lack of a substantial conflict of 
interest. See Exhibit 1. 
In State v. Pursifell. 746 P.2d 270 (Utah App. 1987), 
the Court of Appeals articulated the following with regard to 
motions to appoint new counsel addressed to trial counsel: 
We fully appreciate the possibility that 
defendants will fabricate complaints about counsel in 
an effort to promote delay or otherwise manipulate the 
system. Weighed against that realization, however, 
must be recognition of the inability of many indigent 
defendants, in view of their level of education and 
sophistication, to adequately articulate their 
legitimate complaints involving appointing counsel. 
. . • • 
[W]hen dissatisfaction is expressed, the court must 
make some reasonable, non-suggestive efforts to determine 
the nature of the defendants' complaints and to apprise 
itself of the facts necessary to determine whether the 
defendant's relationship with his or her appointed attorney 
has deteriorated to the point that sound discretion requires 
substitution or even to such an extent that his or her Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel would be violated but for 
substitution. 
Id. at 273. 
Had the Court of Appeals followed its advice to trial 
judges, which applies with equal force to it when it is called 
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upon to consider a motion to appoint new counsel filed by an 
indigent client, Mr. Humphries would have been able to explain 
his significant problems with Mr. Vanderlinden refusing to raise 
meritorious claims on appeal. No reasonable, non-suggestive 
efforts to determine the nature of defendant's complaints and to 
apprise itself of the facts was undertaken by the Court of 
Appeals. 
Investigation of the record on appeal gives a better 
understanding of the problems than expressed by the Court of 
Appeals in its order. While, as the Court of Appeals correctly 
noted, Mr. Humphries' initial concerns were somewhat confused and 
disorganized, over time Mr. Humphries, who has demonstrated 
himself to be a quick study of the law, honed in on the important 
issues on appeal and expressed on the record his inability to 
communicate his impressions to counsel and, most importantly, 
counsel's refusal to raise meritorious issues on Mr. Humphries' 
behalf. 
The actions of the Court of Appeals constituted an 
abuse of its discretion in the matter and resulted in the 
violation of Mr. Humphries Sixth Amendment right to counsel, 
counsel who would follow Mr. Humphries' expressed, non-frivolous 
(on the contrary, highly meritorious) recommendations as to the 
issues to be raised on appeal. 
Nor is this a case where the legal types among us can 
sit back and smile and nod about Mr. Humphries' expressions of 
concern and smirk that his analysis is all wrong. He was right 
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on the money, from the date of his hearing on the motion for 
certificate of probable cause, to today. His analysis of the 
appeal was at least as perceptive as his counsel's analysis, 
though perhaps rough and not quite so artfully articulated. 
Still it is expressed on the record, even though ignored by both 
the trial judge and the Court of Appeals. This Court must hold 
the Court of Appeals to its own standard and require it to more 
fully examine motions like the one made by Appellant. Not to do 
so is an abuse of discretion resulting in ineffective assistance 
of counsel. 
V. Conclusion 
Based on the foregoing, Appellant requests reversal of 
his conviction on the grounds of ineffective assistance of 
appellate and trial counsel and reversal of the Court of Appeals 
decision affirming his conviction. 
DATED: July 11, 1990. 
MOYLE & DRAPER, P.C. 
BY L V^ 
E. Jay SKeen, 
Attorneys for Thomas R. 
Humphries, Defendant 
and Appellant 
^JAL^ 
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R. Paul Van Dam 
Dan R. Larsen 
Utah Attorney General 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
and Respondent 
6100 South 300 East 
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Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
00O00 
F I L E D 
JUL 2 0 7989 
> ^ J Court S* Appofit» 
State of Utah, 
Plaiitiff and Respondent, 
v. 
Thomas R. Humphries, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
ORDER 
Case No, 880704-CA 
This matter is before the Court upon appellant's Motion To 
Appoint New Counsel On Pendency Of Appeal, filed 26 June 1989. 
Appellant is currently represented by counsel who was 
appointed by the Second Judicial District Court. Counsel 
entered an appearance herein on 3 February 1989 and, to date, 
has filed a docketing statement and brief on behalf of 
appellant. Counsel has responded timely to inquiries made by 
the Court with respect to this appeal. 
Appellant shows no substantial conflict of interest with 
his attorney. As appellant was appointed competent counsel, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that appellant's motion is denied. If 
appellant prefers new counsel, appellant is not precluded from 
hiring counsel of his choice. 
Dated this ^ 7 day of July 1989. 
BY THE COURT: 
udge Norman H. Jackson 
